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POLITICA'L SCIENCE 
Utilization of County Boundaries ,n Drawing 
Legislative Districts 
DR. ROBERT A. BARRETT* 
ABSTRACT - Analysis of the traditional and contemporary arguments on county lines as a basis 
of drawing state legislative districts appears to indicate that in a state such as Minnesota, with 
large number of counties and extreme variations between them, county boundary lines should 
not be accorded primary consideration in drawing legislative districts if compliance is sought with 
the "one - man, one - vote" constitutional principle. Minnesota government officials faced with 
reapportioning the state's legislative districts need to determine the role that county boundary 
lines should fulfill in their decision. This paper was prepared originally al the request of the 
Minnesota Governor's Reapportionment Commission. 
A commonly-held but erroneous impression regarding 
Minnesota legislative districts is that district lines have 
always followed county boundary lines. When the 1959 
Minnesota apportionment created new state senate dis-
tricts, fully one-third contained only portions of counties 
and nearly one-half contained two or more counties. 
Roughly only one-sixth of the state senate distircts con-
tained exclusive one-county areas . In the lower house 
it is a frequent occurrence to find legislative districts oc-
cupying only portions of a county. 
Another frequent misconception is that portions of 
one county cannot be grouped with other counties to 
form a legislative district. The 1959 Minnesota appor-
tionment provided for three such instances covering the 
27th, 28th, and 61 st state senate districts . Previously the 
1913 Minnesota apportiompent also had provided for 
three such instances in the 45th, 46th, and 47th state 
senate districts. 
Contrary to popular belief, no restriction exists in 
Minnesota law prohibiting the division of counties or the 
grouping of several counties or portions thereof into state 
legislative districts . In fact, if counties were not grouped 
together, it might well be argued that existing counties 
should be consolidated in order to comply with constitu-
tional requirements: "With enough county consolidation, 
a rule of at least one member for each county might 
conceivably be retained." (David and Eisenberg, 1961). 
Only a dozen of the 50 states have more counties than 
the 87 in Minnesota. Such an abundance poses a redis-
tricting dilemma in that the great population extremes 
make difficult the convenient groupings of counties into 
legislative districts which meet constitutional apportion-
ment standards. 
The Rationale for County Lines 
Alfred deGrazia in his book, Representative Democ-
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racy and Apportionment Theory, 1963, suggested sev-
eral potential factors of representation, including terrain, 
governmental groupings, ethnic differences, community 
or neighborhood groupings, economic similarities, politi-
cal-historical traditions, and others, that might be ac-
commodated through an apportionment standard based 
upon territorial survey, governmental boundaries, official 
bodies, functional divisions of the population, or free 
population alignments. Of these, territorial surveys ( the 
division of the population into contiguous districts com-
posed of equal numbers of voters) are the "most com-
mon in modern times ." 
But, observed deGrazia: 
Corporate or collegial bodies, such as Ameri-
can state legislatures, also use the criterion of 
governmental boundaries in apportioning seats. 
A favored device of early American state gov-
ernments was to apportion seats solely accord-
ing to the county and town boundaries in one 
or both houses of the state legislature. This 
procedure was abandoned in most state govern-
ments, on grounds that it invariably and openly 
worked to the disadvantage of governmental 
units of heavy population density. 
At another point, deGrazia made a strong presentation 
in favor of utilizing governmental boundaries with these 
words: 
To maximize local influences and community 
spirit, apportionment should be based on local 
units of government, as was originally the case 
in a number of American states and is present-
ly the case in several. Then all the electorate 
of a given locale, who are possessed already of 
a degree of solidarity from economic, social and 
political causes, will project that solidarity into 
the . . . state legislature and reinforce it 
thereby. Since many "natural" units of local 
governments are divided or combined in the 
geometry of apportionment, the full impact of 
localism on state . . . legislatures is less than 
it might otherwise be. Nevertheless, territorial 
surveys that produce ... a "contiguous and 
compact territory containing as nearly as prac-
ticable an equal number of inhabitants" will 
provide a considerable reflection of local in-
terests. 
In their respective essays, Baker (Reapportionment, 
The Minnesota Academy of Science 
1960) and David and Eisenberg argue that frontier con-
ditions of isolation and poor communications provided 
a rationale for the representation of counties as units. 
Such representation did little violence to the equal repre-
sentation principle when the distribution of a state's 
inhabitants was fairly uniform and counties were roughly 
comparable. 
"With the long-term trend toward the concentration 
of population in urban areas, the county pattern of rep-
resentation has become less appropriate, but it has been 
maintained or even manipulated primarily to preserve the 
political power of rural interests," according to David 
and Eisenberg. 
The technological factor is frequently raised as justi-
fication for affording greater representation to non-ur-
ban areas. DeGrazia argued that the multiplicity of 
sources for conveying opinions and desires in densely 
settleds areas - mass media, offices of government, of-
fices of public utilities, and other facilities - make resort 
to politicians less frequent. 
The court, in the case of Reynolds vs. Simms, directly 
rebutted this "technological" rationale with the following 
statement: 
But neither history alone, nor economic or 
other sorts of group interests are permissible 
factors in attempting to justify disparities from 
population-based representation. Citizens, not 
history or economic interests cast votes. Con-
siderations of area alone provide an insufficient 
justification for deviations from the equal-
populations principle. Again, people, not land 
or trees or pastures, vote. Modern develop-
ments and improvements in transportation and 
communications make rather hollow, in the 
mid-1960's most claims that deviations from 
population-based representation can validly be 
based on geographical considerations. Argu-
ments for allowing such deviations in order to 
insure effective representation for sparsely set-
tled areas and to prevent legislative districts 
from becoming so large that the availability of 
access of citizens to their representatives is im-
paired are today, for the most part unconvinc-
ing. 
However telling the court's refutation of deGrazia's 
thesis might be, it does not shut the door to the repre-
sentation of political subdivisions as such. The court 
asserted in Reynolds vs. Simms that a state can "ra-
tionally consider according political subdivisions some 
independent representation . . . as long as the basic 
standard of equality of population among districts is 
maintained." This opinion might be interpreted to per-
mit states to specify consideration of political subdivi-
sions within their respective constitutions, which Minne-
sota's constitution specifically does not provide. To 
"maintain the integrity of various political subdivisions 
insofar as possible," in the court's words, might counte-
nance respecting city, village, town, township, or county 
boundaries wherever feasible. The only permissible con-
sideration in the Minnesota constitution alludes to "sec-
tions" that are to be so arranged in an apportionment 
system as to produce equal populations. "Sections" might 
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mean units of one square mile, townships, towns, vil-
lages, wards, precincts, cities, or counties. 
Ultimately, one must address the most common argu-
ment advanced in behalf of county units: their assumed 
role as natural and viable communities. 
To a legislator, lawyer, or politician, the county ap-
pears to be of considerable import. He perceives the 
county as the unit for collecting vital statistics, recording 
property transactions, maintenance of tax rolls, issuing 
of legal documents, and other record-keeping and legal 
transactions. But his is a distorted perception not shared 
equally by the electorate or general populace. That his 
attorney travels to the county seat to complete a legal 
transaction is given little cognizance by the citizen. It 
may properly be suggested that the citizen possesses a 
far greater attachment to his local community be it city, 
village, town, township, or school district. Baker's ex-
amination of the subject concluded that "realistically, it 
is hard to defend the notion that county lines, for ex-
ample, denote real communities." 
Implicit in the argument of representing counties as 
natural communities is an assertion that they enjoy a 
position comparable to the states in the federal system. 
The "federal analogy" fails, however, because the states 
existed as sovereign units prior to the union. They au-
thorized establishment of the union and state sovereignty 
enabled them to demand geographical representation in 
the U.S. Senate as a constitutional compromise. Coun-
ties enjoy no such relationship in theory, law, or com-
mon sense. States are unitary and not federal in com-
position; and counties are mechanical (administrative) 
rather than sovereign subdivisions. Counties are created 
as agents of the state and can be altered or abolished, 
unlike federal units. Few counties have historic identities; 
they merely represent administrative devices for perform-
ing certain state functions at the local level (highways, 
law enforcement, record keeping, welfare, etc.) The 
county is legally classified as a municipal quasi-corpora-
tion lacking even the self-governing authority of the vil-
lage or city and in no manner paralleling the legally 
sovereign position of states in the federal organization. 
Confronting the rationale of the federal analogy in ap-
portioning districts on a county basis, the United States 
Supreme Court stated in Reynolds vs. Simms: 
We find the federal analogy inapposite and ir-
relevant to state apportionment arrangements 
. . . The system of rnpresentation in the two 
houses of the Federal Congress ... is based 
on the consideration that in establishing our 
type of federalism a group of formerly inde-
pendent states bound themselves together un-
der one national government ... Political 
subdivisions of states - counties, cities or what-
ever - never were and never have been consid-
ered as sovereign entities." 
Nor does Minnesota's state constitution make any 
provision for a federal analogy. 
The Division of Counties 
If Minnesota state legislative districts are to be drawn 
in compliance with the "one-man, one-vote" standards 
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required by both the state and federal constitutions, 
county boundary lines will of necessity have to be ac-
corded only momentary consideration. The informed 
consensus of reapportionment observers supports this 
conclusion, as indeed did one of the state legislators in 
orai testimony before the Governor's Reapportionment 
Commission on October 1, 1964. That legislator re-
marked that it is a necessity to divide counties and group 
counties if any attempt is to be made at improvement. 
Belle Zeller, in her recognized classic which culminated 
a four-year study by the American Political Science Asso-
ciation, (American State Legislatures, 1954) noted the 
following: 
Political units (counties) . . . pose puzzling 
and difficult problems that render inadvisable 
their use as representative areas. The unitary 
character of the American state governments 
would seem to render unnecessary the repre-
sentation of units of local government as such. 
Moreover, counties and towns as units of local 
government have largely lost the significance 
they once had and are no longer vital rural 
communities with independent and distinctive 
interests of their own. Of much greater impor-
tance are the larger areas or sections of our 
states. 
It should immediately be recognized that counties are 
constantly divided for a variety of purposes such as the 
Minnesota legislative districts. Under these conditions, 
county election officials sometimes must prepare different 
ballots and conduct separate ballot counts for parts of 
counties in different legislative districts. Candidates for 
office campaign in, and state legislators represent differ-
ent portions of the same county. 
Moreover, cities, which are infinitely more viable u ' ts 
of self government than counties, are commonly divided 
and / or combined with other municipalities or counties 
for the purposes of state legislative districts. Such is the 
case in several communities of Hennepin, St. Louis, and 
Ramsey counties. For county commission districts, also, 
individual Hennepin County municipalities have been 
purposely divided and grouped with adjacent municipali-
ties as provided for by the county commission and sanc-
tioned by the state legislature in 1963. 
The argument of indivisibility also proves critically 
deficient when applied to the cities of St. Cloud and 
Mankato. No county could profess to be a more "natural 
community" than either of those municipalities. Yet, by 
virtue of following county lines, the legislature in the 
1913 and again in the 1959 apportionment laws split the 
natural community of St. Cloud into two artificial com-
munities that presupposed a stronger affinity between 
portions of St. Cloud and the respective counties than 
for the city at large. Correspondingly, the 1913 appor-
tionment law divided the city of Mankato and paired 
each section with adjacent portions of different counties 
in an "artificial community" rather than as a more nat-
ural city community. 
However "inapposite and irrelevant" counties might 
be to the equal representation of citizens in the state leg-
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islature, it would be folly to dismiss lightly consideration 
of them entirely. For if compeUing circumstances do not 
dictate otherwise, "legislators are overwhelmingly per-
suaded that district lines should have some relation to 
other existing communities and jurisdictions." ( Gordon 
E. Baker, Rural versus Urban Political Power, 1955). 
And, as Baker later observed: 
While county government as an administrative 
unit may often seem weak, the county ruling 
clique as a political force is unusually strong. 
Its lines of responsibility and accountability to 
the public are correspondingly weak . . . The 
close political ties between the county officers 
and legislative candidates of ten result in a 'sa-
cred cow' position for the county. 
A Reapportionment Caveat 
A persuasive argument might be made that legisla-
tive district draftsmen have traditionally started from the 
wrong set of assumptions. Normally, they have desig-
nated an ideal district size (50,953 population in the 
Minnesota Senate and 25,288 in the Minnesota House) 
and then grouped counties and subdivisions into districts 
approaching the ideal. 
In this connection it can be suggested that the drafters 
should delineate an ideal size below which no district 
could be established. The drafting problem would then 
shift from the present one of grouping together a suffi-
cient number of counties to approach a maximum ideal 
size to a new problem of paring down various groupings 
to reach a minimum ideal size. The practical result of 
such a transformation would be to place the common 
barriers to "equal population" apportionment in a dis-
advantageous category. For example, if a given group of 
counties were reluctant to permit their boundaries to be 
violated in creating legislative districts, holding their 
boundaries inviolate as "natural communities," their re-
luctance would result in less representation per capita for 
those counties. They would, in effect, be expressing a 
preference for the inviolate character of ,their "natural 
communities" to the principal of "equal-population" 
representation. 
References 
BAKER, GORDON E. Reapportionment. New York: Na-
tional Municipal League, 1960. 
BAKER, GORDON E. Rural vs. Urban Political Power. 
Garden City, New York : Doubleday, 1955. 
DAVID, PAUL and EISENBERG, RALPH. State Legislative 
Redistricting. Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 
1961-1962. 
DEGRAZIA, ALFRED. Apportionment and Representative 
Government. New York: Praeger, 1963. 
ZELL ER, BELLE. American State Legislatures. New York: 
Thomas Y. Crowell and Co., 1954. 
Minnesota. Constitution (1858) . 
U.S. Supreme Court. Baker vs. Carr. 369 U.S. 186, 1962. 
U.S. Supreme Court. Lucas vs. Forty-Fourth General As-
sembly of State of Colorado. 377 U.S. 713, 1964. 
U.S. Supreme Court. Reynold vs. Simms. 377 U.S. 533, 
1964. 
The Minnesota Academy of Science 
